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ABSTRACT
Despite achieving strong performance in the semi-supervised node
classification task, graph neural networks (GNNs) are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks, similar to other deep learning models. Existing
research works either focus on developing defense models or ex-
plore certifiable robustness under GNNs against adversarial attacks.
However, little research attention is paid to the potential and prac-
tice of immunization to adversarial attacks on graphs. In this paper,
we formulate the problem of graph adversarial immunization as a
bilevel optimization problem, i.e., vaccinating a fraction of node
pairs, connected or unconnected, to improve the certifiable robust-
ness of graph against any admissible adversarial attack. We further
propose an efficient algorithm with meta-gradient in a discrete
way to circumvent the computationally expensive combinatorial
optimization when solving the adversarial immunization problem.
Experiments are conducted on two citation networks and one social
network. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed ad-
versarial immunization method remarkably improves the fraction
of robust nodes by 14%-50%, with an affordable immune budget of
only 3.2% edges.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network reliability; • Theory of computation
→ Machine learning theory; • Information systems → Web
applications.
KEYWORDS
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tion; Certifiable robustness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Graph data are ubiquitous in real world, characterizing complex
relationships among objects or entities. Typical graph data include
social networks, citation networks, biological networks, and traffic
networks. In the last few years, graph neural networks (GNNs)
emerge as a family of powerful tools to model graph data, achieving
remarkable performance in many graph mining tasks such as link
prediction, node classification, and graph classification. Despite
their success, similar to deep learning models in other fields [7, 17],
GNNs are proved to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [4, 9, 38],
i.e., imperceptible perturbations on graph structure or node feature
can easily fool the GNN model. This poses a fundamental challenge
for designing robust GNN models for graph data.
Many researchers devote to designing defense methods against
adversarial attacks to GNN model. Defense methods spring up
rapidly and gain success at improving model robustness [10, 33,
Figure 1: Effect of adversarial immunization on Karate club
network. Colors differentiate nodes in two classes. For each
node, we use two bars to represent its robustness before and
after immunization. When the value of robustness is larger
than 0, the correspondingnode is certified as robust (red bar),
otherwise as non-robust (pink bar). Purple circle indicates
the node that becomes robust after immunization. The red
edges are the immune edges.
34, 37]. However, these methods are usually heuristic [5] and only
effective for certain specific attacks rather than all attacks. Conse-
quently, an endless cat-and-mouse game or competition emerges
between adversarial attacks and defense methods [5]. Recently, to
solve the attack-defense dilemma, researchers resort to robustness
certification on graphs [5, 39]. Certificates provide guarantees that
a node with certifiable robustness is robust against any admissible
attack. However, robustness certification has limited usefulness
since certification is only an assessment method rather than an
action guideline to improve robustness against adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we propose adversarial immunization, which is the
first action guideline to improve the certifiable robustness against
any admissible adversarial attack. Specifically, adversarial immu-
nization vaccinates a fraction of node pairs in advance, connected or
unconnected, to protect them from being modified by attacks, mak-
ing the whole graph more robust. We further propose an efficient
algorithm to obtain the target immune edges with meta-gradient in
a discrete way, circumventing the computationally expensive com-
binatorial optimization when solving the adversarial immunization
problem. Fig. 1 illustrates the effect of adversarial immunization on
the well-known Karate club network. We can see that when immu-
nizing 3 edges in advance, the number of nodes certified as robust
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Figure 2: Comparison between attack, defense, robustness
certification and adversarial immunization. (a) Attacker re-
moves the two edges causing target node to be misclassified
from yellow to green. (b) Defense method rewires a grey
edge after attack and make it classified correctly. (c) Robust-
ness certification measures the robustness of nodes against
any admissible attack. (d) Adversarial immunization con-
trols one red edge as immunized, and the target node circled
by purple circle is certified from non-robust to robust.
against any admissible attack increases by 7, indicating that immu-
nizing some critical edges in advance can significantly improves
the certifiable robustness of graph. Taking credit scoring as a real
application example, immunization maintains certain connections
to prevent fraudsters from pretending to be ordinary customers.
To clarify the key position and contribution of our proposed
adversarial immunization more intuitively, Fig. 2 illustrates the re-
lationship between existing attack, defense, robustness certification,
and our proposed adversarial immunization. For a target node, at-
tack method perturbs the graph to misclassify the label of the target
node, while defense method rewires some edges to defend certain
attack. However, the target node may still be misclassified by other
attack method, leading to an endless cat-and-mouse game between
adversarial attacks and defense methods. In contrast, robustness
certification measures the robustness of the target node against any
admissible attack or perturbation, while our proposed adversarial
immunization improves the certifiable robustness of the target node
by immunizing certain edges in advance, changing target node from
non-robust to robust against any admissible attack. Our proposed
adversarial immunization provides a brand new insight into graph
adversarial learning and promotes a more promising and practical
development in this field.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work propos-
ing and formalizing adversarial immunization on graphs to
improve certifiable robustness against any admissible attack,
providing a brand new insight into graph adversarial learn-
ing.
(2) We innovatively tackle the proposed adversarial immuniza-
tion with meta-gradient to greedily obtain the optimal im-
mune edges, circumventing the challenges in computation-
ally expensive combinatorial optimization.
(3) We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method
on both citation network and social network datasets. Exper-
imental results show that our proposed method significantly
improves the certifiable robustness of graph with an afford-
able immune budget.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial attacks and the vulnerability of DNNs have received
attentions in many areas. Researchers discover that deliberate small
perturbations can cause the classifier to misclassify pictures with
high confidence [3, 7, 28]. Specifically, FGSM [14] can generate
adversarial examples rapidly. C&W is a set of attack algorithms [7]
which can make defensive distillation [2] almost completely fail.
While the above studies only focus on specific images, universal
adversarial perturbations [22] are also proposed to fool a classifier
on any image with high probability.
Defense methods resist against adversarial attacks by modifying
inputs, the network architecture or using external models [1, 2, 12,
14, 24]. Specifically, adversarial training [14] defends through modi-
fying inputs. Defensive distillation [24] modifies the network which
extracts knowledge in the form of a class-like probability vector of
training data and feeds it back to train the original model. Akhtar
et al. [1] append extra ’pre-input’ layers and trains them to rectify
perturbed images generated using universal perturbations [22].
Throughout the development of adversarial attack and defense in
computer vision, attack methods are always defended, and defense
methods are also failed under the next attack. This may lead to a
cat-and-mouse game, limiting the development of adversarial learn-
ing. Recently, certified defense method and robustness certification
raise attentions. PixelDP [20] is a certified defense approach using
differential privacy. Cohen et al. [8] turn any classifier that classifies
well under Gaussian noise into a new classifier that is certifiable
robust to adversarial attacks. Carlini et al. [6] provide principles
for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples and a checklist for
avoiding common evaluation pitfalls. In brief, the weakness of DNN
have led to a lot of contributions on adversarial machine learning,
and certifiable robustness is becoming a new hot spot.
2.2 Graph Adversarial Learning
GNNs have shown an exciting results on many tasks of graphs,
e.g., node classification [15, 18, 19], network representation learn-
ing [25], graph classification [26]. However, they are proved to
be sensitive to adversarial attacks [27]. Attack methods can per-
turb both the graph structure [9, 39] and attributes of nodes [38],
while structure-based attacks are more effective, and result in more
attention. For example, Nettack [38] attacks node attributes and
the graph structure with gradient on node classification tasks. RL-
S2V [9] uses reinforcement learning to flip edges. Metattack [39]
poisons the graph structure with meta-gradient, treating the graph
as a hyperparameter to optimize. There are also some methods
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manipulating graph structure with approximation techniques [31],
while others work by rewiring [21] and adding fake nodes [32].
Various defense methods are proposed against the above attacks.
RGCN [37] adopts Gaussian distributions as the hidden representa-
tions of nodes in each convolutional layer, which can defend against
Nettack [38] and RL-S2V [9]. Xu et al. [34] present the adversarial
training framework to defend against the Metattack [39]. Bayesian
graph neural networks [36], trainable edge weights [33], transfer
learning [29] are also used in other defense methods. Neverthe-
less, defense methods are usually heuristic against certain attack,
providing no guarantees [5].
Recently, robustness certification methods have appeared to fill
this gap. Zügner et al. [40] propose to mathematically verify certifi-
able robustness under GNNs w.r.t. perturbations on node attributes.
The node is certifiable robust if GNN can still predict correctly un-
der any admissible attack. Bojchevski et al. [5] provide a robustness
certification method w.r.t. graph structural perturbation, which
exploits connections to PageRank and Markov decision process to
figure out the certificates.
However, measuring robustness is only the first step, and there
is still a lack of research targeted at improving the certifiable ro-
bustness in graph adversarial learning, which is exactly the goal
and contribution of our proposed adversarial immunization.
3 PRELIMINARIES
Since the adversarial learning on graphs mainly take the semi-
supervised node classification as the target task, this chapter first
introduces the task of semi-supervised node classification and a
widely used GNN model to tackle this task. Besides, we also intro-
duce the robustness certification against any admissible attack.
Semi-supervised node classification.Given an attributed gra-
ph G = (A,X ), A ∈ {0, 1}N×N is the adjacency matrix and X ∈
RN×d is the attribute matrix consisting of node attributes, N is
the number of nodes and d is the dimension of node attributes.
We denote the node set as V = {1, 2, ...,N } and the edge set as
E ⊆ V ×V . In the task of semi-supervised node classification, a
subset of nodesVl ∈ V are labelled from class sets K . The goal of
the task is to assign a label for each unlabelled node by the learned
classifier Y = f (A,X ) ∈ RN×K , where K = |K | is the number of
node classes.
Graph neural networks. GNNs have achieved a remarkable
success on the task of semi-supervised node classification task [16,
18, 19, 30]. Among existing GNN models, π -PPNP [5, 19] shows an
outstanding performance. Consequently, in this paper, we consider
π -PPNP as the GNN model to tackle the semi-supervised node clas-
sification problem. π -PPNP separates feature transformation from
feature propagation to simplify model structure, and uses person-
alized PageRank [23] for feature propagation to avoid expensive
computation on message passing. In summary, the model is:
H = fθ (X )
Y = softmax (ΠH ) , (1)
whereH ∈ RN×K is the transformed features computed by a neural
network fθ ,Hdiff := ΠH is defined as the diffused logits. Note that,
the diffused logits are the unnormalised outputs as real numbers
ranging from (−∞,+∞), which are also referred as raw predictions.
Π = (1 − α) (IN − αD−1A)−1 is personalized PageRank that mea-
sures distance between nodes, and D is a diagonal matrix with
Dii =
∑
j Ai j . The personalized PageRank with root node t and a
teleport vector et on graph G is defined as:
πG (et ) = (1 − α)et
(
IN − αD−1A
)−1
, (2)
where et is a the t-th canonical basis vector (row vector). πG (et ) =
Πt, : means the t−th row of personalized PageRank matrix Π.
Robustness certification. Similar to other GNN models, π -
PPNP is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and Bojchevski et al. [5]
certify the robustness of each node on graph by worst-case margin
under π -PPNP. Specifically, the difference between the raw predic-
tions of node t on the ground truth class yt and class k defines the
margin on the perturbed graph G˜:
myt ,k (t , G˜) = Hdifft,yt −Hdifft,k = π G˜ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
)
. (3)
For a target node t , the worst-case margin between ground truth
class yt and class k under any admissible perturbation G˜ ∈ QF is:
myt ,k (t , G˜∗) = min
G˜ ∈QF
myt ,k (t , G˜) = min
G˜ ∈QF
π G˜ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
)
,
(4)
where G˜ = (V, E˜ := Ef ∪ F+) is the perturbed graph consisting of
fixed edges Ef and the perturbed edges F+, G˜∗ is the worst-case
perturbed graph. The set of admissible perturbed graphs QF ={(
V, E˜ := Ef ∪ F+
)
|F+ ⊆ F ,
E˜\E + E\E˜ ≤ B, E˜t \Et +Et \E˜t  ≤ bt ,∀t} , where F ⊆ (V ×V)\Ef is the fragile edge set.
Each fragile edge (i, j) ∈ F can be included in the graph or excluded
from the graph by the attacker, and the selected attack edge F+ is a
subset of fragile edge set F . The perturbations satisfy both global
budget and local budget, where global budget |E˜\E| + |E\E˜ | ≤ B
requires that there are at most B perturbed edges, and local budget
|E˜t \Et | + |Et \E˜t | ≤ bt limits node t to have no more than bt
perturbed edges.
Node t is certifiably robust when
myt ,kt (t , G˜∗) = mink,yt myt ,k (t , G˜
∗) > 0, (5)
where kt is the most likely class among other classes. In other
words, whether a node is robust is determined by the worst-case
margin against any admissible perturbed graph being greater than
zero. This certification method can directly measure the robustness
of graph under GNN model.
Bojchevski et al. [5] use policy iterationwith rewardr = − (H :,yt
−H :,k
)
to find the worst-case perturbed graph. Under certain set of
admissible perturbed graph QF , running policy iterationK×(K−1)
times can obtain the certificates for all N nodes.
4 ADVERSARIAL IMMUNIZATION
In this section, we shed light on adversarial immunization by de-
signing an effective method for selecting and protecting appro-
priate edges in advance as immunized to improve the certifiable
robustness of graph. First, we formalize the problem of adversar-
ial immunization and elaborate it with a widely used GNN model.
Then we propose an efficient algorithm, using meta-gradient to
obtain the optimal immune edges.
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4.1 Problem Formulation
Adversarial immunization aims to improve the certifiable robust-
ness of nodes, i.e. the minimal worst-case margin of nodes under
the node classification task. Specifically, by controlling appropri-
ate immune edges, GNN model can correctly classify nodes even
under the worst case. We formalize the general goal of adversarial
immunization as:
max
Ec ∈Sc
min
k,yt
myt ,k (t , Gˆ), (6)
where Gˆ =
(
V, Eˆ :=
(
EG˜∗ ∪ Econnectc
)
\Eunconnectc
)
is the mod-
ified graph with contribution of both perturbed edges EG˜∗ and
immune edges Econnectc and Eunconnectc , EG˜∗ is the edge set of
the worst-case perturbed graph G˜∗:
G˜∗ = argmin
G˜ ∈QF
myt ,k (t , G˜). (7)
Note that, the immune edges Ec =
(Econnectc ∪ Eunconnectc ) ⊆
(V ×V) contain both connected edges Econnectc to keep them in
the graph and unconnected node pairs Eunconnectc to keep them
not in the graph. Due to the limited immunization budget in reality,
we cannot immunize all node pairs. Here, we consider both local
budget and global budget to constrain the choice of immune edges
Ec . Globally, the number of immune edges in the whole graph
should be no more than global budget C , i.e. |Ec | ≤ C . For each
node t , the number of immune edges cannot exceed the local budget
ct , i.e.
Etc  ≤ ct , where Etc represents the edges associated with
node t . The set of admissible immune edges Ec is defined as:
Sc =
{Ec |Ec ⊆ (V ×V), |Ec | ≤ C, Etc  ≤ ct ,∀t ∈ V} . (8)
Next, we will elaborate with a specific graph neural network
model to achieve an instance of the proposed adversarial immu-
nization problem.
4.2 Adversarial Immunization under GNN
model
We use π -PPNP as the GNN model. The goal of adversarial immu-
nization under π -PPNP is formalized as:
max
Ec ∈Sc
min
k,yt
π Gˆ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
)
, (9)
where π Gˆ is the personalized PageRank of the modified graph Gˆ,
Gˆ =
(
V, Eˆ :=
(
EG˜∗ ∪ Econnectc
)
\Eunconnectc
)
, EG˜∗ is the worst-
case perturbed graph.
Note that, the above immunization objective function is for a
single node t . In order to improve the certifiable robustness of the
entire graph, we take the sum of the worst-case margins over all
nodes as the overall goal of adversarial immunization:
max
Ec ∈Sc
∑
t ∈V
min
k,yt
π Gˆ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
)
. (10)
Challenges: It’s not easy to obtain the optimal immune edges
due to two issues. First, the computational cost on selecting certain
edges from the total node pairs is expensive. Given a global immune
budget ofC edges, the possible immunization plans is
(
N 2
C
)
. This
leads to an unbearable search cost O
(
N 2C
)
, making it difficult to
find the optimal immune edges efficiently. The second challenge
comes from the discrete nature of graph data. The resulting non-
differentiability hinders back-propagating gradients to guide the
optimization of immune edges.
4.3 Solution via Meta-gradient
In this section, we greedily obtain the solution via meta-gradient
to efficiently address the adversarial immunization. To facilitate
the solution of meta-gradient, we first regard immune edges to be
optimized as a hyperparameter with matrix form.
Matrix form of the problem.We use the adjacency matrix to
represent the immune edge set in Eq. 10 and formalize our goal
with the matrix form:
max
Ac ∈ASc
∑
t ∈V
min
k,yt
π Gˆ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
)
, (11)
π Gˆ (et ) = (1 − α)et
(
IN − αD−1Gˆ AGˆ
)−1
, AGˆ = A +A
′
G˜∗
∗ Ac ,
whereAc is the matrix form of immune edges Ec ,A′G˜∗ is the matrix
form of the perturbing edge set corresponding to the worst-case
perturbed graph G˜∗, AGˆ is the adjacency matrix of the modified
graph Gˆ with the contribution of both worst-case perturbing edge
set A′
G˜∗
and immune graph Ac , and ∗ is element-wise multipli-
cation. In immune graph Ac , 0 indicates that the corresponding
edge will be controlled and immunized, which will filter the effect
of perturbations, while 1 implies that the corresponding edge is
not immunized and may be attacked. In other words, Ac can be
regarded as a mask, protecting these immune edges from being
modified or attacked. Such a matrix form transforms the original
computationally expensive combinatorial optimization of edge set
into a discrete matrix optimization problem, reducing the difficulty
of obtaining the optimal solution.
The next and key problem is how to solve the bilevel optimiza-
tion problem with discrete matrix form. We innovatively tackle
this problem by greedy algorithm via meta-gradient to obtain the
optimal immune graph matrix.
Meta-gradient of immune graph matrix. Meta-gradient is
referred as the gradient of hyperparameters [11, 39]. Regarding the
immune graph matrix Ac as a hyperparameter, we can calculate
the meta-gradient of the matrix Ac with the objective function:
∇metaAc = ∇Ac
[∑
t ∈V
min
k,yt
π Gˆ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
) ]
, (12)
where ∇metaAc is the meta-gradient of the immune graph matrix Ac .
Each entry in ∇metaAc represents the effect of the corresponding edge
on the objective function, i.e., worst-case margin. Note that, before
computing the meta-gradient, we should know the most likely class
kt which minimizes the worst-case margin of each node t .
kt = argmin
k,yt
π Gˆ (et )
(
H :,yt −H :,k
)
. (13)
Directly performing gradient optimization via meta-gradient
may result in decimals and the elements greater than 1 or smaller
than 0 in the matrix, making Ac no longer a matrix indicating
the immune choice of edges in graph. To solve this challenge, we
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Figure 3: The training and testing process of adversarial im-
munization.
optimize the matrix of immune edges in a discrete way by greedy
algorithm.
Greedy immunization via meta-gradient. Since the external
of the objective in immunization is a maximization problem, we ap-
ply discrete gradient ascent to solve it. In other words, we calculate
the meta-gradient for each entry of the matrix Ac , and choose the
edge with greatest effect greedily. SinceAc is initialized as a matrix
with all elements of 1, it can only be changed from 1 to 0. Hence,
only the negative gradient is helpful. We define the inverse of the
meta-gradient as the value of corresponding edge:V(i, j) = −∇metaAc(i, j )
, which represents the impact of the corresponding edge on the
goal of adversarial immunization.
In order to preserve the edgeswith greatest influence, we greedily
select the entry with maximum value in V :
(i∗, j∗) = argmax
(i, j)
V(i, j), (14)
and set the corresponding entries in Ac to zero as immune edges,
protecting them from being attacked and modified.
4.4 Algorithm
In this section, we describe the whole algorithm to obtain the opti-
mal immune edges to improve the certifiable robustness of graphs.
We first initialize Ac as a matrix with all elements of 1 (line 4),
indicating that we initially control no edge to be immunized. Then
we iteratively select the edges with the greatest impact. In each
iteration, we choose the most likely class kt which minimize the
worst-case margin of node t (line 6). Then the core step is to cal-
culate the meta-gradient of the objective function for Ac and the
corresponding value V(i, j) (line 8-9). We select the maximum entry
in V(i, j) which satisfy local budget c , and set the corresponding
entry in Ac to zero (line 11-12). This process is repeated until we
obtain enough immune edges to be controlled.
We illustrate both the training and testing process of adversarial
immunization in Fig. 3. During the training process, we first use
surrogate model to obtain the worst-case perturbed graph. Then,
we select and immunize appropriate edges through Alg. 1 via meta-
gradient. As for testing (certificating), we use the immune graph as
a mask to protect certain edges from being modified, and improve
the certifiable robustness of nodes on the graph.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial immunization on graphs
1: Input: Graph G = (A,X ), immunization budget (C, c),
2: Output: Controlled edge matrix Ac
3: G˜∗ ← train surrogate model to get the worst-case perturbed
graph.
4: Initial the controlled edge matrix as Ac = ones((N ,N ))
5: while number of immune edges in Ac < C do
6: kt ← the class which minimize the worst-case margin of
each node t as Eq. 13
7: Gˆ ← after perturbing with G˜∗ of the worst-case class kt and
immunizing with Ac .
8: ∇metaAc ← the meta-gradient computing in Eq. 12
9: Value V(i, j) ← −∇metaa(i, j )
10: Select the edges that have already been controlled and set
the corresponding entries to 0 in V .
11: (i∗, j∗) ← maximal entry in V which satisfy c .
12: Ac [i∗, j∗] = 0← control one more edge (i∗, j∗).
13: end
14: Return: Ac
4.5 Complexity analysis
The computational complexity of adversarial immunization de-
pends on theGNNmodel. Specifically, under GNNmodel ofπ−PPNP,
the personalized PageRank matrix π is dense leading to a computa-
tional complexity and memory requirement of O (N 2) . Correspond-
ingly, the computational complexity of the surrogate attack model
is also O (N 2) . As for the optimization process of immunization,
operations of both element-wise multiplication and meta-gradient
require a computational complexity and memory of O (N 2) . Since
we have to calculate the minimal worst-case margin for each pair
of classes (k1,k2), the computational complexity and memory in
each iteration is O (K2 · N 2) . Considering the total of C iterations
to find the optimalC edges to be immunized, immunization method
has a computational complexity of O (C · K2 · N 2) and a memory
requirement of O (K2 · N 2) with π -PPNP.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Dataset
We evaluate our proposed method on two commonly used cita-
tion networks: Citeseer [5], Cora-ML [5], and a social network
Reddit [35]. In citation networks, a node represents a paper with
attributes of key words and label of paper class, and the edge means
the citation relationship. In Reddit, each node represents a post
with attributes of word vectors and label of community, while each
edge means the post-to-post relationship.
Due to the large size (N =232,965) of Reddit social network, we
only keep a subgraph to conduct the experiments. Specifically, we
first randomly select 10,000 nodes, and four classes with more than
600 nodes are selected as our target classes. All nodes in these target
classes are kept, remaining 3,143 nodes. Then, in order to retain
the network structure as much as possible, we further include the
first-order neighbors of the kept nodes, resulting in 3,623 nodes
in total. Class besides the target four classes is marked as the fifth
class, i.e., other-class, containing 480 nodes.
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Table 1: Statistics of the evaluation datasets
Dataset Type NLCC |ELCC | d K
Citeseer Citation network 2110 3668 3703 6
Cora-ML Citation network 2810 7981 2879 7
Reddit Social network 3069 7009 602 5
Experiments are conducted on the largest connected component
for both citation networks and social networks. The statistics of
each dataset are summarized in Table 1.
5.2 Baseline
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose adversarial
immunization on GNN. Thus, there are no direct existing baseline
for comparison. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method,
we design three types of methods to choose immune edges as our
baselines, including random-based, attribute-based and structure-
based methods.
• Random-basedmethods.We consider two randommethods with
different candidate set of immune edges. Random method selects
immune edges randomly from all edges, while Attack Random
selects immune edges from the worst-case perturbed edges obtained
by the surrogate attack. Note that, since Attack Random knows
the worst-case perturbed edges that the surrogate model attacks, it
is stronger than the Random baseline.
• Attribute-based methods. Researches [33, 39] show that attack-
ers tend to remove edges between nodes from the same class and
add edges to node pair from different classes. Therefore, we design
baselines that maintain the edges with high similarity between the
attributes of nodes under the same class, and maintain the discon-
nection of node pair with low attribute similarity under different
classes. As for the measurement of similarity, we consider the com-
monly used Jaccard score and cosine score, namely Jaccard and
Cosine respectively.
• Structure-based methods. We also design baselines considering
the structure importance of edges. Specifically, for global structure
importance, we use edge-betweenness as a measurement, which is
defined as the number of shortest path that goes through an edge in
a graph [13]. For local structure importance, we adopt the Jaccard
similarity between the neighbors’ labels of node pair. These two
indicators reflect the connectivity and importance of edges, and we
heuristically choose the immune edges with greater values, namely
Betweenness and Bridgeness respectively.
5.3 Experimental Setup
The settings of GNN model in our experiments, i.e., π -PPNP, are
the same with [5]. Specifically, we set the transition probability
α = 0.85. As for our surrogate model, it has two settings of sce-
narios [5]. One is named as AddRem, where the fragile edge set
is F = (V ×V) \Ef , i.e. the attacker is allowed to add or remove
connections of any node pair in the graph. The other is named as
Rem, where F = E\Ef for a given graphG = (V, E), i.e. attackers
can only remove connected edges in the graph. The fixed edge set is
Ef = Emst , where Emst is the edge of the minimum spanning tree
(MST) of the graph. The minimum spanning tree is kept to ensure
the connectivity of the graph and reachability between nodes, since
the personalized PageRank can only be calculated on connected
component. Following the settings in robustness certification [5],
we regard the fragile edges as directed, which means |F | ≈ 2 ∗ |E|
in Rem scenario and |F | ≈ N 2 in AddRem scenario. For both the
surrogate model and robustness certification, the local budget is
limited as bt = Dt in Rem scenario and bt = max (Dt − 6, 0) in
AddRem scenario where Dt is the degree of node t , and global
budget is B = N 2 in both scenario, which gives sufficient budget for
both the surrogate model and robustness certification, thus proving
the effectiveness of our proposed adversarial immunization even
under strong attacks. Besides, policy iteration is adopted to generate
the worst-case perturbation.
For adversarial immunization, the local budget of immune edges
is ct = Dt in both Rem and AddRem scenario. For global budget
C , we range from 50 to 500 in Rem scenario and range from 200 to
2000 in AddRem scenario. For baselines, random-based methods
randomize 10 times in both scenarios. As for attribute-based meth-
ods, in Rem scenario, they only immunize the connected edges
with high attribute similarity between nodes under the same class,
while in AddRem scenario, they immunize connected edges with
a probability of 0.3 and immunize unconnected node pairs with a
probability of 0.7. Such setting of probability considers the fact that
there are about 30% removed edges among the worst-case perturbed
edges in all datasets.
5.4 Effect of adversarial immunization
To comprehensively demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
adversarial immunization, we conduct experiments on three datasets,
i.e., Citeseer, Cora-ML, Reddit, and two certification scenarios, i.e.,
Rem and AddRem.
5.4.1 Scenario of Rem. In Rem scenario, the attacker can only
remove the connected edges. We show the effect of adversarial
immunization from two aspects: the number of robust nodes and
the average of worst-case margin. Note that, the worst-case margin
can directly measure node robustness and is a more intuitive and
direct reflection of the immunization effect. In Fig. 4, the upper
figures show the change of the ratio of robust nodes when varying
global budget of immunization, and the lower figures show the
change of the average of worst-case margin. Since only the node
with positive worst-case margin can be certified as robust, the
sudden changes of certifiable robustness resulting in sudden jumps
in the ratio of robust nodes.
As shown in Fig. 4, we can see that all methods work better
when increasing global immune budget from 50 to 500, indicating
that the more sufficient our immune budget is, the more certifiable
robustness of the graph.
For random-based methods, Attack Random performs better
than Random on all datasets. This is because Attack Random knows
the worst-case perturbed edges that the surrogate model attacks.
However, even with the same access of the worst-case perturbed
graph, Attack Random is far worse than our proposed immunization
method, which further proves the superiority of our method.
For attribute-based methods, both Jaccard and Cosine methods
even perform worse than Random method on three datasets. This
result indicates that edges with high attribute similarity have less
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Figure 4: Scenario of Rem: Immunization performance when varying global immune budget from 50 to 500 with a stride of
50. The local budget of immunization and certification is ct = bt = Dt . The upper figures (a-c) show the change of the ratio of
robust nodes, while lower figures (b-d) show the change of the average of worst-case margin.
effect on certifiable robustness against any admissible attack, and
may even bring some negative disturbance on the selection of
immune edges.
For structure-based methods, Betweenness is superior to Bridge-
ness, indicating that global structure importance is more effective
than local structure importance when selecting immune edges. We
also note that Betweenness method has similar performance to
Attack Random on Core-ML and Reddit, but worse performance
on Citeseer. This may be because that there are less fragile edges
in Citeseer, making Attack Random easier to get the appropriate
immune edges randomly.
As for our proposed immunization method, i.e., ImmunRem, it
significantly outperforms all the baselines on all datasets. On Reddit
(Fig. 4(c), 4(f)), ImmunRem increases the ratio of robust nodes by
50% when the global budget increasing to 450, i.e., 3.2% of all edges.
On the other two datasets, Citeseer and Cora-ML, our method also
brings 14% and 30% improvement, when also immunizing 3.2%
edges.
5.4.2 Scenario of AddRem. We also conduct experiments on the
scenario of AddRem, where the attacker is allowed to remove as
well as add edges. Since the attacker can attack a wide range of
edges, and the fragile F = (V ×V)\Ef has millions of elements,
here we vary the global immune budget C from 200 to 2000 and
limit the local budget of both surrogate model and certification
as bt = max(Dt − 6, 0). Note that immune edges contain both
connected edges and unconnected node pairs. Additionally, since
structure-based methods can only calculate the importance of con-
nected edges, here we only select and immunize connected edges as
baseline. Besides, in order to better demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method in the scenario of AddRem, we add ImmunRem as
baseline where the immune edges are selected only from the con-
nected edges by our proposed method with the same local budget
bt and ct .
On all datasets, our immunization method significantly outper-
forms all the baselines as shown in Fig. 5. Although Betweenness
and ImmunRem only immunize connected edges, they perform best
among all baselines. This is because the range of selectable edges
as large as O(N 2) in scenario of AddRem, making it harder for
baselines to select appropriate edges. Directly selecting immune
edges from connected edges significantly reduces the search space,
resulting in a good performance. Note that, the edges in Citeseer
is less than 4000 and the local constraint of attack bt makes the
attacked edges fewer than 1200, so the immunization effect will not
improve with the increase of global budget after 1200 edges in Fig.
5(a) and 5(d).
As for our proposed method, i.e. ImmunAddRem, its performance
when immunizing 200 edges is even better than the performance of
the strongest baseline when controlling 2000 edges. Additionally,
ImmunAddRem performs better than ImmunRem, indicating that
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Figure 5: Scenario of AddRem: Immunization performance when varying global immune budget from 200 to 2000 with a stride
of 200, where local budget of immunization is ct = Dt and certification is bt = max(Dt − 6, 0).
our approach can select appropriate unconnected node pairs to be
immunized among a vast searching space O(N 2). On Citeseer, Cora
and Reddit, our ImmunAddRem improves the number of robust
nodes by 1.3%, 4.8% and 3.6% respectively when only immunizing
0.02% of all node pairs. This results further demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our proposed adversarial immunization method even in
a difficult scenario.
5.5 Impact of local budget
We explore the influence of the local budget of immunization on
immune performance when varying the global immune budget
from 50 to 500 in Rem scenario. Experimental results are shown in
Fig. 6. Note that the local immune budget is always non-negative,
for example, curve Dt − 6 in Fig. 6 means ct = max(Dt − 6, 0).
We observe two significant phenomenons: 1) Under the same
global budget, the smaller the local budget is, the worse the immune
effect is. This is because that as the local budget ct becomes tighter,
the constraint of immune edges are stricter, resulting in limited
immunization effect. 2) Under the same local budget, the immuniza-
tion effect improves with the increasing of global immune budget.
This phenomenon holds for all different settings of local immune
budget, which is consistent with the observation in Sec. 5.4.
5.6 Case study
In order to have an intuitive understanding of our proposed immu-
nization method, we further show the immune edges and analyze
its characteristics. We take Cora-ML as a case to study the immune
edges from three aspects, i.e., structure, attributes and labels. Here,
both the surrogate model and the certification scenario is Rem,
and local immune budget is ct = Dt and global immune budget is
C = 50. Fig. 7(a) visualizes the immune edges and the nodes that be-
come robust through immunization. Fig. 7(b) offers the distribution
of immune edges on the above three aspects.
Attribute analysis. First we analyze node attribute similarity
of the immune edges. In the top left figure in Fig. 7(b), the attribute
similarity of nodes at both ends of immune edges is mainly dis-
tributed from 0 to 0.2, while that of all edges is distributed from
0 to 0.4. The attribute similarity of the nodes at both ends of im-
mune edges is lower. This may be one reason why attribute-based
baselines do not work well in Fig. 4.
Structure analysis.We take edge-betweenness as an indicator
to analyze the structure characteristics of immune edges. As shown
in the top right figure in Fig. 7(b), the edge-betweenness of all edges
is mainly concentrated in 0, i.e., nearly 80% edge’s betweenness is
0. However, only 20% of immune edges have an edge-betweenness
value of 0. There are some immune edges whose betweenness even
reaches about 0.17. In other words, the edge-betweenness of the
immune edges is statistically larger than other edges generally.
This explains why the edge-betweenness method is the strongest
baseline. In Fig. 7(a), the light green node with the highest degree,
is the intersection of many immune edges. The other enlarged blue-
green node connects with several immune edges, which also has
high degree. This result indicates that adversarial immunization
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Figure 6: The influence of local budget of immunization: local immune budget ct is getting tighter from Dt to max (Dt − 6, 0)
with a stride of 2, where global immune budget is varying from 50 to 500 with a stride of 50 and local budget of certification is
bt = Dt in Rem scenario.
(a) Visualization of Immunization on Cora-ML
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Figure 7: (a) The colorings of the nodes indicate different classes. Larger nodes represent nodes that become robust through
immunization. The blue edges are immune edges. Insets enlarge some nodes connected to the immune edges. (b) The top left
figure shows the distribution of node attribute similarity of immune edges. The top right figure tells the distribution of edge-
betweenness of immune edges. The bottom left figure shows the distribution of label similarity of immune edges. The bottom
right figure describes the distribution of label similarity of first-order neighbors of immune edges.
tends to control the edges with certain structural domination, which
is critical for improving certifiable robustness of graph.
Label analysis. For labels, we analyze the node’s label similarity
immune edges. There are about 80% of all edges which have the
same node label at both ends, while the percentage of immune
edges is only 60%. We also pay attention to the label similarity of
first-order neighbor immune edges. Formally, the label similarity
of edge (i, j) is the average similarity between the labels of the
neighbors of node i and the label of node j. The label similarity of
the first-order neighbor of edge (j, i) can be calculate in the same
way. In the bottom right figure of Fig. 7(b), about 40% of all edges
have label similarity of first-order neighbor with value 1.0, while the
percentage of immune edges is only 15%. In sum, the label similarity
of the immune edges is lower than all edges. Thismay due to that the
personalized PageRank of π -PPNP: Π = (1 − α) (IN − αD−1A)−1
involves the inverse operation, making the diffusionmatrix be dense
and the heterogeneous edges be helpful for node classification in
some way. As a result, immunizing such heterogeneous edges are
also helpful for improving the certifiable robustness of graph under
the node classification task.
Experiments on Citeseer and Reddit give similar results which
are not included because of space limitation.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose the first work on adversarial immunization
on graphs. Focusing on the graph structure, adversarial immuniza-
tion aims to improve the certifiable robustness of graph against any
admissible attack by vaccinating a fraction of node pairs, connected
or unconnected. To circumvent the computationally expensive com-
binatorial optimization, we further propose an efficient algorithm
with meta-gradient in a discrete way to figure out suitable immune
edges. The effectiveness of our proposed method are evaluated on
three well-known network datasets, including two citation net-
works and one social network. Experimental results reveal that our
immunization approach significantly improves the certifiable ro-
bustness of graphs under the evaluation metrics of both robust node
ratio and worst-case margin. In future work, we tend to explore the
adversarial immunization focusing on both graph structures and
node attributes.
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